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John B. Taylor (1993) has proposed that U.S.
monetary policy in recent years can be de-
scribed by an interest-rate feedback rule of the
form
(1) it 5 0.04 1 1.5~p t 2 0.02!
1 0.5~yt 2 y# t !
where it denotes the Fed’s operating target for
the federal funds rate, pt is the inflation rate
(measured by the GDP deflator), yt is the log of
real GDP, and y# t is the log of potential output
(identified empirically with a linear trend). The
rule has since been subject to considerable at-
tention, both as an account of actual policy in
the United States and elsewhere, and as a pre-
scription for desirable policy. Taylor argues for
the rule’s normative significance both on the
basis of simulations and on the ground that it
describes U.S. policy in a period in which mon-
etary policy is widely judged to have been un-
usually successful (Taylor, 1999), suggesting
that the rule is worth adopting as a principle of
behavior.
Here I wish to consider to what extent this
prescription resembles the sort of policy that
economic theory would recommend. I consider
the question in the context of a simple, but
widely used, optimizing model of the monetary
transmission mechanism, which allows one to
reach clear conclusions about economic wel-
fare. The model is highly stylized but incorpo-
rates important features of more realistic models
and allows me to make several points that are of
more general validity. Out of concern for the
robustness of the conclusions reached, the anal-
ysis here addresses only broad, qualitative fea-
tures of the Taylor rule and attempts to identify
features of a desirable policy rule that are likely
to hold under a variety of model specifications.
I. The Taylor Principle and Determinacy
A first question about the Taylor rule is
whether commitment to an interest-rate rule of
this kind, incorporating no target path for any
monetary aggregate, can serve to determine an
equilibrium price level at all. It is sometimes
argued that interest-rate rules as such are unde-
sirable, as they lead to indeterminacy of the
rational-expectations equilibrium price level.
But this familiar result assumes a rule that
specifies an exogenous path for the short-term
nominal interest rate; determinacy is instead
possible in the case of feedback from an endog-
enous state variable such as the price level. In
fact, many simple optimizing models imply that
the Taylor rule incorporates feedback of a sort
that suffices to ensure determinacy, owing to the
dependence of the funds-rate operating target
upon recent inflation and output-gap measures.
Here I consider the question in the context of
the “neo-Wicksellian” model derived in Wood-
ford (2000). This reduces to a pair of log-linear
relations, an intertemporal “IS” equation of the
form
(2) yt 5 Et yt 1 1 2 s~it 2 Etp t 1 1 ! 1 gt
and an expectations-augmented “AS” equation
of the form
(3) p t 5 k~yt 2 ytn! 1 bEtpt 1 1 .
Here gt and ytn are composite exogenous distur-
bances, and the coefficients satisfy s, k . 0,
0 , b , 1.
Let monetary policy be specified by an interest-
rate rule of the form
(4) it 5 i*t 1 fp ~pt 2 p# ! 1 fy ~yt 2 ytn 2 x# !,
where i*t is any exogenous stochastic process for
the intercept, and p# and x# are constant “target”
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values for the inflation rate and the output gap,
respectively. Then using (4) to eliminate it in
(2), the system in (2) and (3) can be written in
the form
(5) Etzt 1 1 5 Azt 1 et
where z9t 5 [pt yt], and et is a vector of
exogenous terms. System (5) has a unique sta-
tionary solution (assuming stationary distur-
bance processes) if and only if both eigenvalues
of the matrix A lie outside the unit circle. If we
restrict attention to policy rules with fp, fy $





The determinacy condition (6) has a simple
interpretation. A feedback rule satisfies the Tay-
lor principle if it implies that, in the event of a
sustained increase in the inflation rate by k
percent, the nominal interest rate will eventually
be raised by more than k percent. (Taylor
[1999] stresses this as a criterion for sound
monetary policy.) In the context of the model
sketched above, each percentage point of per-
manent increase in the inflation rate implies an
increase in the long-run average output gap of
(1 2 b)/k percent; thus a rule of the form
represented by (4) conforms to the Taylor prin-
ciple if and only if the coefficients fp and fy
satisfy (6). In particular, the coefficient values
in (1) necessarily satisfy the criterion, regard-
less of the size of b and k. Thus the kind of
feedback prescribed in the Taylor rule suffices
to determine an equilibrium price level. Wood-
ford (2000) shows that the Taylor principle con-
tinues to be necessary and sufficient for
determinacy when the family of rules is ex-
tended to allow for interest-rate inertia of the
kind characteristic of estimated Federal Reserve
Board reaction functions.
Another argument against interest-rate rules
with a venerable history asserts that targeting a
nominal interest rate allows for unstable infla-
tion dynamics when inflation expectations ex-
trapolate recent inflation experience. The basic
idea, which originates in Knut Wicksell’s de-
scription of the “cumulative process,” is that an
increase in expected inflation, for whatever rea-
son, leads to a lower perceived real interest rate,
which stimulates demand. This generates higher
inflation, increasing expected inflation still further
and driving inflation higher in a self-fulfilling
spiral. But once again, the classic analysis im-
plicitly assumes an exogenous target path for
the nominal interest rate. The sort of feedback
from inflation and the output gap called for by
the Taylor rule is in fact of the sort needed to
damp such an inflationary spiral.
James Bullard and Kaushik Mitra (2000)
consider the stability of rational-expectations
equilibrium under a form of adaptive learning
dynamics in the model sketched above, again in
the case of a policy rule of form (4). They find
that condition (6) is also necessary and suffi-
cient for “expectational stability” of the equi-
librium (i.e., for convergence of the learning
dynamics to rational expectations). Thus they
confirm the Wicksellian instability result in the
case of feedback from inflation or the output
gap that is too weak; but this is not a problem in
the case of a rule that conforms to the Taylor
principle. Taylor’s emphasis upon raising inter-
est rates sufficiently vigorously in response to
increases in inflation is again justified.
II. Inflation and Output-Gap Stabilization Goals
Even granting that the Taylor rule involves
feedback of a kind that should tend to exclude
instability due purely to self-fulfilling expecta-
tions, one must consider whether the equilib-
rium determined by such a policy is a desirable
one. The dependence of the funds-rate target
upon the recent behavior of inflation and of the
output gap is prescribed in order to damp fluc-
tuations in those variables, and Woodford
(2000) shows that in the simple model described
above it has this effect. But are inflation and
output-gap stabilization in fact sensible proxi-
mate goals for monetary policy?
Woodford (1999a) argues that both inflation
and output-gap stabilization are sensible goals
of monetary policy, as long as the “output gap”
is correctly understood. In fact, the paper shows
that in the context of the simple optimizing
model behind equations (2) and (3), it is possible
to motivate a quadratic loss function as a second-
order Taylor-series approximation to the expected
utility of the economy’s representative household,
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equal to the expected discounted sum of period
losses for certain coefficients l . 0 and x* . 0:
(7) Lt 5 p t2 1 l~yt 2 ytn 2 x*!2.
Here ytn is the same exogenously varying natural
rate of output as in (3). This is defined as the
equilibrium level of output that would obtain in
the event of perfectly flexible prices; in general,
this will not grow with a smooth trend, as a
result of real disturbances of many kinds.
There is a simple intuition for the two stabi-
lization objectives in (7). To the degree of ap-
proximation discussed in Woodford (1999a),
the efficient level of output yte (the same for all
goods, in the presence of purely aggregate
shocks) varies in response to real disturbances
in exactly the same proportion as does the
flexible-price equilibrium level ytn; the two dif-
fer at all times by the constant factor x* . 0.
The average squared deviation of the log output
of each good from the efficient level can then be
decomposed into the squared deviation of the
average log output yt from the efficient level
and the variance of the log output level across
individual goods. This latter output dispersion
term is in turn proportional to the dispersion of
prices across goods due to imperfect synchro-
nization of price changes, which in the case of a
particular model of staggered price-setting is
proportional to the square of the inflation rate.
This last result [and hence the exact form (7)] is
somewhat special. But the connection between
price dispersion and instability of the general
level of prices holds more generally, so that a
goal of inflation stabilization may be justified
on more general grounds.
We thus find that the stabilization goals
implicit in the Taylor rule have a sound the-
oretical basis, subject to two important qual-
ifications. The first is that Taylor’s classic
formulation of the rule seeks to stabilize in-
flation around a target rate of 2 percent per
annum. Instead, the welfare-theoretic loss
function (7) implies that the target rate of infla-
tion should be zero, as this is the rate that mini-
mizes relative-price distortions associated with
imperfect synchronization of price changes. Tak-
ing account of additional frictions may modify
this conclusion, but in general this will also justify
the introduction of additional stabilization goals as
well (Woodford, 1999a).
The second qualification is that the “output
gap” that one should seek to stabilize is the gap
between actual output and the natural rate of
output defined above. This contrasts with the
assumption made in Taylor’s (1993) compari-
son between the proposed rule and actual U.S.
policy, where the output gap is assumed to be
measured by output relative to a deterministic
trend. In theory, a wide variety of real shocks
should affect the growth rate of potential output
in the relevant sense; as shown in Woodford
(2000), these include technology shocks,
changes in attitudes toward labor supply, vari-
ations in government purchases, variation in
households’ impatience to consume, and varia-
tion in the productivity of currently available
investment opportunities, and there is no reason
to assume that all of these factors follow smooth
trends. As a result, the output-gap measure that
is relevant for welfare may be quite different
from simple detrended output.
One source of evidence that this is so comes
from a comparison of a detrended output series
with the behavior of real unit labor costs. In the
model that underlies both (3) and (7), the output
gap yt 2 ytn appears because the average ratio of
marginal supply cost to price is an increasing
function of it; this cost/price ratio determines
both the incentive to raise prices in (3) and the
deadweight losses in (7). A measure of real
marginal cost is thus an appropriate proxy for
the relevant output gap. But in quarterly U.S.
data, variations in real unit labor cost are neg-
atively correlated with detrended real GDP
(Fig. 1). Moreover, Argia M. Sbordone (1998)
shows that equation (3) gives a very poor ac-
count of U.S. inflation when detrended real
GDP is used as the gap measure but explains
much of the medium-frequency variation when
real unit labor costs are used instead (see also
Jordi Galı´ and Mark Gertler, 1999.)
In each panel of Figure 2, a small, unre-
stricted vector autoregression (VAR) is used to
forecast the future evolution of the gap proxy,
and then (3) is “solved forward” to obtain a
predicted quarterly inflation series. The as-
sumed value of b is 0.99; in panel (b), the
elasticity k is chosen to minimize the mean-
square prediction error, while in panel (a) an
arbitrary positive value is assumed (as predicted
inflation is negatively correlated with actual in-
flation in any event). The dramatic improve-
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ment in fit in panel (b) suggests that real unit
labor cost is a much better measure of the true
output gap, at least for purposes of explaining
inflation variation. But Figure 1 indicates that
the use of such an alternative measure would
matter greatly for practical implementation of
the Taylor rule.
III. Optimal Responses to Real Disturbances
Supposing now that a central bank responds
to appropriate measures of the economy’s de-
parture from its stabilization goals, I turn to a
subtler question. Is the contemporaneous feed-
back prescribed in (1) sufficient to ensure an
optimal response of policy to real disturbances?
The answer is that in general, a rule this simple
(one that avoids any direct response to other
information about the real disturbances, and that
incorporates only contemporaneous feedback
from the goal variables) must be suboptimal.
As a simple illustration of this, suppose again
that all real disturbances affect ytn and yte
equally. Then it is optimal to completely stabi-
lize both inflation (at zero) and the output gap
(at the level consistent with zero inflation).
However, this is not possible with a rule of form
(4) where the intercept is a constant, for if in
equilibrium inflation and the output gap are
both constant, such a rule would prescribe a
constant interest rate. Instead, in the optimal




(8) rtn 5 s21@gt 1 Et ~yt 1 1n 2 ytn!#
is the Wicksellian natural rate of interest (i.e.,
the equilibrium real rate under flexible prices).
In our simple model, rtn is an exogenous process
(independent of monetary policy), but it should
vary in response to a wide range of real
disturbances.
A policy rule of form (4) is consistent with
the optimal equilibrium, however, if it satisfies
two requirements. First, fp and fy must satisfy
(6), in order to ensure determinacy. Second, the
rule must include a time-varying intercept i*t 5
rt
n
, for consistency with a stable inflation rate
and output gap. Such a variable intercept is
actually in the spirit of Taylor’s prescription,
which describes the intercept as incorporating
“the central bank’s estimate of the equilibrium
real rate of interest” (Taylor, 1999 p. 325). But
for his empirical illustration, Taylor assumes
this to be a constant (2 percent), while in reality
there may be substantial variation in the natural
FIGURE 1. ALTERNATIVE MEASURES OF THE OUTPUT GAP
Note: The dashed line shows detrended real GDP, while the
dotted line shows real unit labor costs (ULC).
FIGURE 2. INFLATION PREDICTED USING ALTERNATIVE
GAP MEASURES
Note: The solid lines show actual inflation, while the dashed
line (panel a) and dotted line (panel b) show predicted
inflation. The assumed value of b is 0.99. In (a), an arbitrary
positive value of elasticity k is assumed, while in (b) k is
chosen to minimize the mean-square prediction error.
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rate. Failure to adjust the intercept to track
variation in the natural rate of interest will result
in fluctuations in inflation and the output gap,
just as in Wicksell’s analysis (Woodford, 2000).
Of course, in a more realistic analysis, the
optimal equilibrium is unlikely to involve com-
plete stabilization of inflation and output. For
example, while many real disturbances should
affect ytn and yte equally, others may not (Wood-
ford, 1999a; Marc P. Giannoni, 2000), in which
case it is no longer possible to fully stabilize
both inflation and the welfare-relevant gap yt 2
yt
e
. Alternatively, it may be desirable to accept
some variability of inflation and the output gap
for the sake of less variable nominal interest
rates. In these cases, the optimal equilibrium
will involve some fluctuations in inflation and
the output gap in response to real disturbances;
but contemporaneous feedback from the goal
variables is still generally insufficient to bring
about optimal interest-rate responses, for when
the private sector is forward-looking, optimal
policy almost always involves a commitment to
some later response to current shocks, which
then implies that policy must be history-
dependent at that later date.
In particular, in the model sketched above, it
is optimal for the nominal interest rate to be
adjusted only gradually in response to new in-
formation about the natural rate of interest
(Woodford, 1999b; Giannoni, 2000). This is
because (2) implies that aggregate demand is as
much affected by expected future short real
rates of interest as by current short rates. Thus a
predictable policy of gradual interest-rate ad-
justment allows substantial effects on aggregate
demand without requiring large swings in short-
term interest rates. The advantages of interest-
rate inertia in a generalized Taylor rule have
also been shown through numerical analysis in
the context of more complex econometric mod-
els that nonetheless incorporate realistic degrees
of forward-looking private-sector behavior
(e.g., John C. Williams, 1999).
IV. Conclusions
The Taylor rule incorporates several features
of an optimal monetary policy, from the stand-
point of at least one simple class of optimizing
models. The response that it prescribes to fluc-
tuations in inflation or the output gap tends to
stabilize those variables, and stabilization of
both variables is an appropriate goal, at least
when the output gap is properly defined. Fur-
thermore, the prescribed response to these
variables counteracts dynamics that could oth-
erwise generate instability due to self-fulfilling
expectations.
At the same time, the original formulation of
the rule may be improved upon. The measure of
the output gap suggested in Taylor’s (1993)
empirical discussion may be quite different
from the theoretically correct measure, as the
natural rate of output should be affected by a
wide variety of real disturbances. The empirical
discussion also assumes a constant intercept,
but a desirable rule is likely to require that the
intercept be adjusted in response to fluctuations
in the Wicksellian natural rate of interest, and
this too should vary in response to a variety of
real disturbances. Finally, the classic formula-
tion assumes that interest rates should be set on
the basis of current measures of the target vari-
ables alone, but an optimal rule will generally
involve a commitment to history-dependent be-
havior; in particular, more gradual adjustment
of the level of interest rates has important ad-
vantages. These considerations call for further
research to improve measurement of the natural
rates of output and of interest, and to analyze
the consequences of inertial rules in the context
of more detailed models.
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